

On Mind and Body:

An Anti-Physicalist Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Philosophy

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Abstract

An understanding of the fundamental nature of consciousness continues to evade researchers due to the absence of an identified mechanism relating the mental to the physical. Consciousness encapsulates a plethora of mental phenomena that vary in tractability, many of which will eventually be explained in terms of neural or computational processes in the event of requisite technological advancement. In this paper, I isolate and address only those phenomena and cognitive processes that cannot possess empirically viable explanations. I seek to resolve the hard problem of consciousness, so named for the inability of providing a purely functional explanation of “what it is like” to be an individual experiencing any mental state. Drawing upon philosophical thought experiments and neurological and psychological case studies, I argue that a solution to the hard problem of consciousness necessitates an acceptance of qualia to allow for an intuitive notion of conscious experience. I therefore reject physicalism due to its inherent inconsistency and adopt a nuanced form of dualism on the basis that conscious states possess irreducibly immaterial properties while yet relying upon and hinging upon the neural makeup of the brain. Ultimately, the implications of the veracity of such a solution to the hard problem of consciousness are manifold. To unify mind and body is to provide a comprehensive theory of consciousness that resolves the ambiguity surrounding the preservation of personal identity, the future of artificial intelligence, and the degree to which technology can be manipulated for human advancement without damaging inherent humanity.

Purpose and Methodology

The intent of this paper is to present a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. To this end, I adhere to the following methodology:

- (1) I provide an analysis of background literature in the context of evaluating theories of mind that are prominent in the field.
- (2) I argue in favor of property dualism on the basis of the elimination of competing theories through a consideration of thought experiments.
- (3) I examine the practical implications of dualism on the assumption of its veracity.

Background Literature Review

Two papers in particular lay much of the conceptual foundation for present and future considerations in the link between mind and body. Prior to delving into a definition of the hard problem of consciousness itself, it is important to understand the underlying principle of which it is comprised. This notion of the subjective character of experience is best illustrated in the 1974 paper “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” by Thomas Nagel. Nagel considers conscious experience to be a phenomenon that is exhibited in animals of varying degrees of complexity as well as in humans. Nagel takes it as a premise that bats have conscious experiences, by virtue of being mammals, despite having drastically different perceptive mechanisms than humans. The most prominent of these perceptive mechanisms is echolocation. By virtue of sonar hearing, the sensory information that must be processed in the brain of a bat is correlated with echoes and shrieks, and this drastic difference from human hearing is reflected in the wiring of the two respective brains. Both human hearing and sonar hearing are valid and functional perceptive mechanisms, and yet each possesses a certain inherent, subjective quality that cannot be replicated, such that a human

being cannot imagine hearing like a bat. Thus, I, for example, have absolutely no way of truly knowing *what it is like* to be a bat. Though the external and behavioral characteristics of a bat can be empirically determined, even if I could perfectly imagine having these characteristics myself, I would know only what it is like for *me* to behave as a bat behaves, not for a *bat* to behave as a bat behaves. I cannot imagine beyond my own subjective experience (Nagel 3).

I move now to the primary author in consideration, David Chalmers, having established this rather intuitive notion of conscious experience: what it is like to be any given being. In his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” David Chalmers distinguishes the “truly” hard problem from less complex mental phenomena on the basis of the ease with which they can be empirically tested. Easy problems of consciousness concern those phenomena that will be fully explicable in terms of computational or biological mechanisms, even if modern science is unequipped to do so at the present time. In this category, Chalmers lists the capacity of a system to evaluate its own states, the ability of said states to be reported, the way in which information is synthesized, intentional focus of attention on a target, control of behavior, and the difference between a conscious (awake) state and a state of sleep (Chalmers 2). To “solve” one of the easy problems is simply to model the mechanism or trace the process by which the phenomenon is produced in the brain. A solution to an easy problem is empirically viable.

The hard problem of consciousness is the notion of why a physical state is conscious rather than not. The hard problem is “hard” due to the inability of functionally explaining what it is like to be any given individual in any conscious state. This is strongly related to the classic mind-body problem, concerning the nature of the influence or relationship between the material brain and the immaterial mind. There is assumed to exist an “explanatory gap” between the material brain and consciousness, which yields the hard problem itself (IEP). Probing the nature

of the relationship between the mental and the physical yields an array of explanations, which, for the sake of simplicity, will be condensed into two broad categories: physicalists and dualists, the latter group more broadly classifiable as qualophiles.

The Case for Physicalism

The physicalist solution to the hard problem is to assume consciousness is entirely material. Physicalism, then, is true in a world *X* if, and only if, any world *Y* that is a perfect material duplicate of *X* is a duplicate *simpliciter* (equivalent without qualification or exception). Consciousness is produced wholly and exclusively from a particular arrangement of atoms. There is no soul, nothing purely mental, but simply neural impulses that give rise to our perception of conscious experience. Philosopher David Papineau (1947 – present) in his 2002 paper “The Case for Materialism” argues, along these lines, that a conscious state is *exactly* the same as the corresponding physical state, and, by extension, that it is exactly identical to “physically realized functional states” (Papineau 14). He assumes three distinct premises:

- (1) Conscious experiences can be reflected in the physical.
- (2) Effects seen in the physical are produced *entirely* by “purely physical prior histories.”
- (3) Such effects are not always overdetermined by discrete causes.

The first and second premises are foundational physicalist arguments. It is fairly intuitive that the consciousness one perceives is somehow tied to his or her physical brain. To state that effects in the material are purely causal is only objectionable (to an opponent of the theory) in that it is an explicit tenet of physicalism. An event *E* is considered overdetermined, as introduced in the third premise, if it is directly caused by *both* sources *X* and *Y*. Thus, according to (1) and (2), a certain effect *E* has both a mental and a physical cause. However, (3) indicates that there cannot exist

two distinct causes, because there is no overdetermination involved in consciousness. Therefore, because there can only be one cause, the physical and the conscious causes are one and the same. If physicalism is accepted as a theory of mind, the physical brain alone brings about mental processes and consciousness.

However, the Knowledge Argument, the primary argument against physicalism, posits that a conscious experience necessarily comprises more than physical properties (SEP). Frank Jackson illustrates the argument in his 2002 paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia” in terms of Fred, a tomato-sorter with enhanced ability to discriminate between colors and properties, and, perhaps more famously, Mary, the essentially colorblind neurophysiologist. Mary meticulously studies the nature of vision exclusively from within a black-and-white room, such that she eventually possesses *all* physical information that can possibly be learned via empirical processes. At this point, Mary leaves the room. Upon entering a world in which there is color, it seems intuitive that Mary has acquired new information concerning vision and the world being observed (Jackson). Once she has observed, say, an apple, she has learned what redness is like. Once she has looked at the sky, she has gained new knowledge of what it is to be blue. Mary has not learned any new physical information, but yet lacks understanding of a fundamental *quality* of the world, color, until she leaves the room. Therefore, physical information does not solely constitute all *information*, and materialism must be rejected as a theory of the mind. Redness and blueness are simply stand-ins for any phenomenal characteristics, known as qualia. In short, any given individual *A* is unable to know that another individual *B* experiences any quale if *A* has never come into contact with and experienced that quale himself (SEP).

The Knowledge Argument notably deviates from Nagel’s argument concerning what it is to be a bat. In short, knowing *what it is to be* Mary (which I, for example, can know, as a human

being possessing comparable mental capacities) is very different than being able to experience the *particular* qualia she experiences (which I cannot know, as they are exclusive solely to her). “No amount of information of whatever kind that *others* have *about* [an individual] amounts to knowledge of the second” (Jackson). Indeed, the Knowledge Argument allows the dismissal of any notion that Nagel’s bat argument raises an objection to physicalism altogether, as it relies heavily on assumptions about individual imagination in translating the conscious experiences of bats. Were physicalism to be accepted (and true), all information necessary to perfectly “imagine” the experiences of a bat would be readily attainable, making irrelevant this uncertain act of imagination or extrapolation (Jackson). The fact that some information, concerning qualia, is “missing” is therefore indicative of the unfeasibility of physicalism.

The Case for Dualism

Dualism, then, proves an alternative to physicalism in that it rejects the main physicalist tenet that the mind *is* the physical brain. It is easily argued in terms of Leibniz’s Law: if an object has a property *F* if and only if another object has *F*, then *x* and *y* are identical (SEP). If a property is isolated and demonstrated to be irrefutably vital to mental states but irrelevant to physical states, the property constitutes a counterexample to physicalism and, consequently, support for dualism (IEP). One such argument stems from the privacy of mental states: only the person possessing a mental state can truly know it, and as physical states are unquestionably public, mental and brain states must be distinct. Another argument concerns the supposed inability to attribute any notion of intentionality to the purely physical, as one might to the mental, because neurons appear to fire without any “purpose” or “feeling” – they fire simply and solely because they are triggered. One critique of arguments stemming from Leibniz’s Law is that the dualist

cannot (yet) account for the way privacy or intentionality is generated, and therefore Occam's razor seemingly yields a nod toward physicalism (IEP). However, the mind arguably cannot be described in the same terms as a physical object, and cannot possess properties such as color or depth. If this inability to ascribe the mental to the physical is accepted, then physicalism is rejected in favor of dualism.

Proponents of substance dualism, one of two primary forms of dualism, hold that the conscious mind and the physical brain are two causally interacting discrete substances. They are different substances on the basis of their differing properties, and a substance dualist believes that the being possessing various mental states and properties is greater than the sum of the states alone – that the being or individuals is immortal (SEP). The mental substance is commonly considered to be a soul. The two substances, the mental and the physical, are wholly independent from each other. Just as non-conscious physical items can exist in space without thought, there can exist disembodied consciousness or pure thought without a tether to the material. While popular in the philosophical views of Plato, Descartes, and other ancient philosophers and thinkers, substance dualism has faded from the scientific eye, to be effectively replaced by its similarly dualistic, yet property-oriented, alternative.

The property dualist, in contrast, considers a single, universal substance that itself possesses two different types of properties: the mental and the physical. These properties can exist together in one object, or the physical can exist alone, but to claim that a mind can exist without a physical body would essentially be to accept substance dualism. “Mental phenomena are non-physical properties of physical phenomena, but not properties of non-physical substances” (IEP). Thus a conscious state does exist in the physical realm, but yet possesses distinct and different properties than would the exclusively physical. Property dualism is

nebulous, but is framed as follows: Any mental state may possess properties that are not physical, such as consciousness and qualia, but the mind is, necessarily, dependent on the body.

The primary objection to any form of dualism or interactionism is its lack of adherence to the laws of physics. Interactionists assume causal interaction between the mental and the physical, but if “the microphysical realm [were] causally closed,” then a conscious or mental state could have no influence on the physical whatsoever (Chalmers). By extension, if there were some way in which the mental *could* concretely and tangibly affect the physical, then energy in the broader system of the world would not be conserved. Work on a physical object requires the expense of physical energy. Thus in order for the mental to effect a result on the physical, “mental” energy must be converted to the “physical” energy compatible with Newtonian mechanics. If this conversion were to occur, the net energy of the universe would be variable, which directly contradicts a principal tenet of physics, the law of conservation of energy. Chalmers appeals to a self-described dualistic “controversial interpretation” of quantum mechanics to overcome this problem, citing the contradiction that arises in the arguments of the physicalist: dualism is rejected because it does not adhere to the laws of physics, but yet his argument from quantum mechanics, with a heavy reliance on the most foundational laws of physics, is rejected solely on the basis of the philosophical theory of dualism with which it aligns (Chalmers). While such a theory, in which the mind alters and guides but does not bring about physical processes, arguably allows consciousness to causally interact with the material while still being empirically viable, there is no “proof” of interactionism or dualism. The inconsistency in physicalist position does, however, negate an all-encompassing and immediate rejection of dualism, and therefore renders dualism yet a competitive and highly viable theory of mind.

Aside from Nagel and his bats, the primary argument for property dualism stems from Chalmers and his conception of the philosophical zombie. The argument is fairly straightforward. Such a zombie, otherwise known as a zombie twin, is perfectly identical to a single conscious human being in nearly every respect. It is perfectly physically identical, down to the exact atomic structure. It is perfectly behaviorally identical, such that I, or any other person, would be unable to distinguish between the zombie twin and the conscious human being after interacting with both. The beings are entirely empirically identical, but for one crucial distinction. The zombie twin has no mental states or experiences. It is not conscious.

Thus the zombie argument echoes and illustrates the hard problem of consciousness. To seek the mechanism through which physical processes yield conscious experiences is to ask an essentially analogous question: why am I not a zombie? If there does exist a world perfectly identical to ours, deviating from ours only in that it contains non-conscious zombies, then consciousness is a non-physical property that our world possesses and the zombie world lacks (Chalmers). An extra and wholly non-physical element exists in one world to prevent conscious persons from being non-conscious zombies. If we are to accept physicalism, then the zombie world must be perfectly identical to ours, both in physical properties and conscious properties arising from the physical or the lack thereof. Because philosophical zombies are conceivable, physicalism ought to be rejected in favor of dualism.

Conceivability, here, entails possibility. In its simplest form, the Chalmers' argument is valid, but yet founded upon moderately controversial premises (Chalmers, SEP):

- (1) Zombies are conceivable.
- (2) Anything that is conceivable is possible.
- (3) Therefore zombies are possible.

Critics cite the ambiguity of the term “conceivable” in the first premise. It seems logical that I am able to conceive of a being or a notion falsely, and therefore conceivability ought not necessarily indicate possibility. It is also implicit in the zombie argument that there exist entire worlds perfectly atomically identical to our own, deviating solely in the lack of consciousness. If such zombie worlds are conceivable, they are yet not *necessarily* possible. If the zombie worlds are only potentially plausible, then the zombie argument as a whole provides a basis on which to refute physicalism. Yet it is nowhere near sufficiently widely accepted to constitute a definitive argument for Chalmers’ dualist theory.

Personal Identity

The preservation of personal identity is a notable criterion for solutions to the mind-body problem, as illustrated by a classic example from science fiction: the *Star Trek* transporter. The crew of the Starship Enterprise makes frequent use of the device to achieve instantaneous transportation to a different physical location. The exact mechanism of the device is unknown, but, roughly put, the act of transportation itself occurs after the “blueprint” for a perfect atomic replicate of the individual being transported is uploaded to the computer, which in turn applies this ‘blueprint’ to a new set of atoms in the new physical location, which assemble into the traveler. The problem with transporters, however, is that the individual that stepped into the transporter may cease to exist even before instantaneously materializing on another planet.

The physicalist is fully comfortable stepping into the transporter. If a conscious state is wholly constituted by a physical brain state, then the conscious mind exists where the particular atomic structure and organization is replicated. If the “blueprint” is perfectly replicated, then the person is instantaneously transported to a new physical location, having sustained neither change

nor harm to his being. To the substance dualist, however, it is the conscious mind that must transfer between locations, not the physical body. If only the physical were replicated in the new location, then the original substance dualist would be dead upon stepping into the transporter. The property dualist, on the other hand, faces a related problem, which stems from the notion that the mental and the physical are comprised of a universal substance but are characterized by different properties.

Various transporter accidents in science fiction illustrate that what must be transported such that personal identity is preserved is seemingly something more than just the physical brain or the Cartesian soul. In the 1996 episode “Tuvix” of *Star Trek: Voyager*, two men, the Security Chief Tuvok and the cook Neelix attempt to return from their mission to the surface of a planet, but instead what materializes on the floor of the Starship *Enterprise* is seemingly a new man altogether. This man, who responds to the name Tuvix, exhibits not only the physical features of *both* Tuvok and Neelix, but also has personality traits highly characteristic of each individually. Despite being a fusion of Tuvok and Neelix, Tuvix considers himself independent from both, and pleads his own right to live when Captain Janeway splits him back into two. The diagram below illustrates the relationship between mind and body in the episode.

Table I: Tracing mind and body through the transporter accident in “Tuvix.”

Before Fusion (Tuvok ₁ ; Neelix ₁)	$\frac{\text{Tuvok}_1}{\text{Tuvok}_1}$	$\frac{\text{Mind}}{\text{Body}}$	$\frac{\text{Neelix}_1}{\text{Neelix}_1}$
After Fusion (Tuvix)	$\frac{\text{Mind}}{\text{Body}}$	$\frac{\text{Tuvok}_1 + \text{Neelix}_1}{0.5 \text{ Tuvok. } 0.5 \text{ Neelix}}$	$\frac{\text{Mind}}{\text{Body}}$
After Fission (Tuvok ₂ ; Neelix ₂)	$\frac{\text{Tuvok}_x ?}{\text{Tuvok}_2}$	$\frac{\text{Mind}}{\text{Body}}$	$\frac{\text{Neelix}_y ?}{\text{Neelix}_2}$

Personal identity is predicated upon either maintaining psychological continuity or bodily continuity. It is evident that Tuvix cannot be equivalent to Tuvok₁ or Neelix₁ because neither holds these factors in common. If Tuvix is considered identical to both Tuvok and Neelix, then by the transitivity of identity, Tuvok and Neelix are equivalent.

To the dualist, the mind exists independently from the body, and therefore two minds must exist within the same physical brain to allow Tuvix to exist. To the physicalist, however, the conscious is exclusively a product of the mental. The atoms from which Tuvok₂ and Neelix₂ are materialized are not the original atoms that constituted their bodies. They are physically identical yet discrete beings. Either substance or property dualism allows that Tuvok₂ = Tuvok₁ and Neelix₂ = Neelix₁ on the basis of psychological continuity. Materialism cannot say the same. Tuvok₁ and Neelix₁ cease to exist the second they enter the transporter. To touch briefly on ethics, Captain Janeway's execution of Tuvix is excusable only on one of two grounds: (1) There ought to be one soul for each body, and the two crewmates were proven to continue to exist within Tuvix, or (2) were she to adopt a Utilitarian standpoint. Nevertheless, physicalism seems inferior to dualism in response to the problem of the transporter.

Artificial Consciousness

Perhaps the most important practical implication for finding a conclusive fundamental understanding of human consciousness is the degree to which it can be manufactured. The field of artificial intelligence (AI) seeks to create an artificial being that exhibits thought and experiences conscious states, but a crucial distinction must be drawn between weak AI, the use of intelligence as a powerful computing tool humans can manipulate to their own ends, and strong AI, the notion that a computer can be programmed to *be* a mind. It is intuitive that a

proponent of the viability of strong, conscious AI would adhere to an alternate theory of mind known as computationalism, which holds that intelligent behavior is causally explained by a series of computations in the cognitive system (or the human biological brain). As a reductionist theory, this is an extension of physicalism. The Chinese Room Argument, first introduced by Berkeley professor John Searle in his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” in 1980, is the framework in which I will discuss the potential of artificial consciousness. In short, I will use it to refute the notion that there could exist a man-made, programmed computer that quite literally possesses cognitive states.

The Chinese Room Argument is as follows. Imagine that Searle, a native English speaker, is inside a closed, empty room, being fed input from a native Chinese speaker in the form of characters or symbols. Inside the room, Searle has perfectly comprehensive reference materials to interpret these formal symbols, such that he can link any string of these symbols with a corresponding output in Chinese, which can be perfectly understood by a native, fluent Chinese speaker. The “machine” represented by Searle and the Chinese room would pass the “Turing Test” – a human evaluator would not be able to distinguish between the words put out by an actual Chinese speaker and by Searle’s “computer” – but yet Searle does not *understand* Chinese. When he looks at the symbols, he sees only shapes and brush strokes. He knows no deeper meaning. Despite the perfect output indistinguishable from fluent Chinese, this computer cannot understand Chinese as Searle can understand English.

There must exist some thing – some quality – that produces in Searle understanding of English and a lack thereof where Chinese is concerned (Searle). There is no understanding in the latter case because the Chinese room lacks causality. Thus intentionality is a result of causal relations, not simply one of a formal program. As a result, the mind is to the brain as a program

is to the hardware on which it runs. The program is purely formal, as we have seen, but the intentional states of the computer, akin to the conscious states of the individual, have some additional quality preventing them from being purely formal. Mental states are the product of the operation of the brain, but a program is not a literal product of the computer. This, ultimately, is where Searle leaves us. If strong AI is plausible, then a program can be perfectly programmed such that any machine running the program will *understand* Chinese (SEP). Because Searle, or any individual, is fully able to run a program for perfect Chinese output without understanding Chinese, strong AI cannot exist. Strong AI is plausible if and only if the brain does not matter where the mind is concerned, if it can exist independently. I therefore employ the Chinese Room argument to reveal its residual dualist tendencies.

The mind is a product of the brain, but yet the mind and the brain are discrete entities (Caplan). There is residual dualism in that the brain is purely physical, and the mind mental, and while the mind depends upon the brain, both exist and are distinct. This is not substance dualism, because the mental and physical entities cannot both exist independently. Nor is it property dualism, as a property ought not to be conceivable without reference to the entity of which it is an attribute, and I can conceive of a mind without conceptualizing a brain (Caplan). Dualism would be demonstrably false if mental states did not exist, but I take it as an implicit premise in this paper that they do, and indeed there is yet no evidence to the contrary. Dualism is intuitive and consistent, but property dualism and substance dualism each field certain critiques. I now consider further models of dualism, in order to provide a more nuanced solution to the hard problem of consciousness and to resolve notions of personal identity and artificial intelligence.

It is logical to object that there is nothing it is like to *be* a machine, and therefore that a machine can never be conscious due to its lack of qualia and phenomenal experience. Simply

programming the machine to monitor environmental factors and respond accordingly is insufficient to produce a conscious being, due to the lack of private sensations and subjective, qualitative experience (IEP). Therefore, on the assumption of the veracity of dualism, consciousness relies upon qualia, and if an artificial being or machine cannot experience qualia, then it cannot be considered conscious.

A response to this objection can be formulated on the basis of both internal and external perception. For the purpose of illustration, assume the machine in question to be Lt. Commander Data from *Star Trek: The Next Generation*: a sentient android anatomically analogous to a human being, yet incidentally exhibiting a fundamental lack of understanding of elements of human behavior (Hanley). Assume, also, that modern technology has progressed to such an extent that Data is constructed to have a *functionally equivalent*, albeit inorganic, system inside him that replicates the physiological system that produces feeling in human beings (IEP). Data now responds to stimuli exactly as a human being does, but this simply implies functional similarity, not any sort of guarantee of consciousness. Data is a philosophical zombie, a perfect functional duplicate of a human being without qualia or conscious experience. Physicalism was refuted, and dualism rejects any notion of artificial consciousness on the basis of absent qualia.

Synthesis and Panpsychism

Resolution to the tension between physicalism and dualism may come from an initially counterintuitive theory: panpsychism. The panpsychist holds that *mind* is a fundamental element of the universe, such that some physical objects do have conscious states. This is not to say that *all* beings or objects exhibit consciousness, but rather that all members of certain fundamental physical types have conscious experiences. Panpsychism is true if all quarks or all photons have

conscious states, even if all numbers and rocks do not (Chalmers). By virtue of being conscious, there is “something it is like” to be a member of one of these fundamental physical types. If the conscious experience of smaller, physical entities is considered microexperience, then microphenomenal properties are instantiated such that there is something it is like to be a quark or a photon, just as there is something it is like to be Nagel’s bat or to be Mary, the colorblind scientist (Chalmers). Panpsychism provides a synthesis of important tenets of both dualism and physicalism, but lacks empirical backing.

Nevertheless, panpsychism is a compelling theory of consciousness on the basis of the consequences of its rejection. An opponent of panpsychism is necessarily a proponent of emergentism, as the theories are mutually exclusive: the panpsychist believes that mind is a fundamental element of reality and has existed in the universe since the dawn of time, whereas the emergentist believes that mind emerged at a given point during the course of evolution. While initially agreeable, emergentism suffers on the basis of plausibility. Traits that emerge evolutionarily are reconfigurations of preexisting physical matter, of which the mind is not comprised, and therefore this mechanism seems to lack a crucial element of the explanation (IEP). To be an emergentist, further, is to accept that only classes of beings exhibit the characteristics and qualities necessary to possess a mind, while the vast majority of the universe is purely physical. An argument for panpsychism proceeds as follows. If there is just one fundamental reality in the universe, then it is in part comprised by mental phenomena. Experiential phenomena are thus physical phenomena, and as mental phenomena fundamentally cannot arise from the non-mental, everything within the one reality is conscious (Strawson). Thus, panpsychism provides the element lacking in the explanation of emergentism, and despite being counterintuitive, is the most logically sound theory of mind and consciousness.

Conclusions

In this paper, I sought a solution to the hard problem of consciousness and a mechanism through which the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical could be overcome. Literature in the field demonstrates that the hard problem of consciousness seems to necessitate an acceptance of qualia in order to allow for an intuitive notion of conscious experience. I reject physicalism on this basis, and that of its inherent inconsistency, and therefore demonstrate that the most viable theory of consciousness is a nuanced form of that of the dualist. Substance dualism, while accounting for phenomenal experience, is ultimately implausible in allowing for disembodied consciousness, but property dualism is compatible with an intuitive conception of the conscious individual and also with thought experiments concerning the nature of qualia and private subjective experience. By virtue of the relationship it posits between mind and body, dualism allows continuity of personal identity in cases of fission and fusion, and disallows any notion of artificially created consciousness, limiting the potential of artificial intelligence and, to an extent, technological advancement. Panpsychism is more compelling than property dualism in providing a synthesis of both physicalism and dualism, but is currently little empirically supported and would require the radical overthrow of the current mechanistic worldview. Panpsychism provides the most elegant marriage of the strengths of the physicalist and qualiphiles arguments, but until better supported, I conclude that the solution to the hard problem of consciousness is that conscious states have immaterial properties but rely on the physical. Property dualism ought thus to be accepted as the most viable theory of consciousness.

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